(Image: Troy Page / t r u t h o u t; Adapted: phunkstarr, Travelin' Librarian, Joshua Davis)
This story was originally published on Truthout.org and is being republished here under a Creative Commons license.
One week after the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice told the press corps, “This isn’t Pearl Harbor.” No, it was worse.
In 1941, the United States didn’t have a director of central intelligence, 14 intelligence agencies and an overall intelligence budget of more than $50 billion to provide early warning of enemy attack. One day after a Nigerian man nearly blew an airliner out of the sky, Director of Homeland Security Janet Napolitano and White House spokesman Robert Gibbs told the media that the system had worked. No, the system was dysfunctional.
In 2009, we had two additional intelligence agencies, a czar for national intelligence and an intelligence budget of more than $75 billion. In all three cases, there was sufficient intelligence available to prevent the attacks. In all three cases, however, our intelligence efforts were unimaginative, divided and diffuse.
A blizzard of warnings went unheeded in all three cases. The United States had broken the Japanese military code, which provided many warnings of a decision to attack the United States. In the case of 9/11, the Central Intelligence Agency received warnings from foreign liaison intelligence services, including the French, German, Israeli and Russian services.
The German intelligence service warned both the CIA and Mossad, the Israeli service, in the summer of 2001 that terrorists were planning to hijack commercial aircraft and use them as weapons to attack US targets. The Israelis issued their own warnings to the FBI and the CIA in August 2001 that al-Qaeda was planning to attack US targets. The State Department and the CIA even possessed information that al-Qaeda had decided on targeting American Airlines and United Airlines, prompting some Foreign Service officers to change travel plans.
As early as August 2009, the CIA and the National Security Agency had sensitive information on a person of interest dubbed the “Nigerian,” who was suspected of meeting with terrorist elements in Yemen. The mainstream media are treating Yemen as a new concern, but Yemen has been a problem for terrorism for the past ten years.
Adm. Tony Zinni had been warned in 2000 not to refuel ships off the Yemeni coast, but chose to ignore these warnings. The USS Cole was attacked in October 2000. A prominent Nigerian banker and former senior government official, well known to the international community, relayed suspicions about his son to the US Embassy and the CIA station in Lagos, but there was no effort to approach Yemeni officials to gather information on the banker’s son, Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab.
The son was a poster child for the “no fly” list, buying his ticket with cash, checking no luggage, lying to British authorities about his student visa and spending several months in Yemen. The British denied Abdulmutallab reentry, but the US State Department didn’t even bother to check whether he had an entry visa for the United States.
In fact, he had a multiple entry visa and, since all intelligence and law enforcement agencies have access to State’s consular database listing visa holders, this fact was available throughout the community. It’s one thing to worry about due process in dealing with a US citizen; it makes no sense to wait for additional derogatory information in the case of a foreigner who has traveled to Yemen and whose father has provided a warning about his son’s extremism.
The simple fact is that the intelligence community is not a “community”; it does not share intelligence effectively and it fails to make corporate decisions. The NSA had transcripts of al-Qaeda phone conversations in 2001 and sensitive intercepts on the “Nigerian” in 2009 that it didn’t share with the CIA, the FBI or the National Security Council. The FBI accumulated intelligence on al-Qaeda that it hoped to use in a criminal case against Osama bin Laden; therefore, most of this intelligence never left the compartmented areas of FBI headquarters. The CIA withheld information on two 9/11 terrorists, presumably because it hoped to recruit these suspects as sources.
We were led to believe the intelligence situation had improved in the wake of 9/11, but in view of the traditional cultural and professional jealousies of the military and civilian intelligence agencies, we have no evidence of significant change. Various departments and agencies have their own watch lists for limiting travel of terrorist suspects, but apply their own parochial concerns to operational activities and often ignore the intelligence products of rival agencies.
The master list at the National Counter Terrorist Center is too large and unwieldy (more than 550,000 names) to be useful, and the State Department computer network lacks an automatic feedback loop that would link a suspect to a US visa. The Department of Homeland Security never should have been created and should have been abolished in the wake of Hurricane Katrina (remember “you’re doing a heck of a job, Brownie”). If we must have such a superfluous organization, then it should possess a centralized depository of terrorist suspects containing all relevant information.
The analytical capabilities of the CIA, the FBI and the DHS have not been enhanced by the creation of the intelligence czar. Moreover, it is revealing that President Barack Obama made his decision last month to increase troops in Afghanistan without requesting a National Intelligence Estimate from the so-called intelligence community. Perhaps, he understands that there are too many instances where assumptions drive facts in the intelligence process.
Former members of the 9/11 Commission are claiming that their recommendations have not been fully implemented, but it was the 9/11 Commission that helped to create the crazy-quilt intelligence organization that we now have, with too many working parts and a cumbersome bureaucracy. The Commission is responsible for the creation of the Director of National Intelligence (DNI), a sclerotic and bloated bureaucracy that has done little to improve strategic intelligence, and the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), which is at the center of the Nigerian intelligence failure. Hurricane Katrina in 2005 demonstrated DHS is dysfunctional; the Nigerian failure teaches us that the DNI and the NCTC need reform.
The 9/11 Commission’s creation of an intelligence czar has ensured that diversity and competition in collection and analysis of intelligence will be given short shrift. Truth is elusive within the intelligence process, and there is rarely a single answer to a controversial question or problem. The best intelligence analysis often comes from contrarian thinkers, but the militarized intelligence process rewards consensus and not competition.
In the one area where we need centralization, watch lists for terrorist suspects, we have a redundancy of collections. Homeland Security keeps one list for border crossings; the State Department has a list for visas; the Transportation Security Administration has a no-fly list and a selectee list with 4,000 and 14,000 listings, respectively; and the National Counter Terrorism Center has an unwieldy database of 550,000 names. The criteria for each list differ, and it takes an interagency group to determine whether to place an individual on a specific list.
There is at least one thing we have to be thankful for. In view of the failed efforts of Robert Reid in 2001 and Abdulmutallab, we can be thankful al-Qaeda still has not perfected an effective detonator. We should also applaud the post-9/11 reforms that limited the amounts of liquid that can be taken on commercial aircraft.
The United States may not be so lucky the next time around, so President Obama must take a hard look at his entire national security team, particularly CIA Director Leon Panetta, DNI Dennis Blair, and NSC Deputy Director John Brennan, to make sure they are taking the necessary actions to reform the process. The failure points seem obvious, with bad decisions being made at a relatively low level in the process. The president has not demonstrated an interest in reforming the intelligence community, however, despite his campaign rhetoric.
Ironically, the president has left the CIA without its most effective component for investigating failure because he hasn’t named a statutory inspector general for the CIA to replace John Helgerson, who announced his retirement ten months ago. Helgerson was responsible for the most authoritative investigation of the 9/11 failure, which the Bush administration and the CIA managed to cover up.
Melvin A. Goodman is a senior fellow at the Center for International Policy and adjunct professor of government at Johns Hopkins University. He spent 42 years with the CIA, the National War College, and the U.S. Army. His latest book is Failure of Intelligence: The Decline and Fall of the CIA.
The so called terrorists may or may not have had a plan to blow up airliners on September 11, 2001, but they were not the ones that did the destruction of that day.
There is a mountain of proof that it was done with the active help of elements of our own government, including Department of Defense, NORAD, and the White House. There is reason to believe that Israel interests also played a part. But there is no real evidence that al-Qaeda had any part in it at all, except as patsies. Most of the phone calls (if not all) said to have been made by passengers have proven false, including those reported by the Secratary Olsen. There is no real evidence even of te alleged hijackings, except for supposed “left behind” baggage that was “maraculously found all too quickly following the Airliner crashed. There are terrorist that do have causes, unfortunately, those that now lead this country are by far the most dangerous. They cause needless wars of aggression based on crimes against humnity that they themselves plan and have carried out. Of all the blunders that were made by NORAD on September 11, 2001, who really was in direct command of NORAD by special orders when the airliners were supposedly hijacked and running loose without even being effectively tracked? Richard Cheney, the Vice President of the United States! As well the alleged terror attacks were known throughout the Defense Department, the Whitehouse and the Intelligence agencies. Yet those same leaders decided to make the Air Defence busy that day with a number of diversioinary practice excercises, obviously to confuse the radar for the real attacks that they themselves had programed to crash into the WTC and Pentagon?. No one was punished for err of that day simply because it the attacks were in fact a success? bin Laden said at the time that he had nothing at all to do with the destruction, yet our government and main media report the reverse, and create and manipulate videos that make it appear as bin Laden confesses, when he does not.. It would be interesting to identify who is really producing the bad quaity fake videos supposedly made by the terrorists. They always appear at the best time when needed politically for our government “war on terror” runners back here at home. likewise, is it just a coincidence (again and again) that it was just decided that the US should get involved in expanding the hoax war on terror into Yemen. Then suddenly the airliner bomb trick pops up. Or was it simply a new terror boost for the anti freedom anti-Constitutiinal Patriot Act trick?
I am sick of it. The US government is in fact causing real terror here at home as it also creats even more terrorists in the Middle East and now Africa, when the whole world would all be better of if we would pull our troops, CIA, and their vile contractors back home. Peace.
“The CIA forced me to allow terrorists into the US.”
http://visasforterrorists.blogspot.com/
By J. Michael Springmann, former US Consulate Visa Officer in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia
Between 1987 and 1989, I had been assigned to what I call the CIA’s Consulate General at Jeddah, principal city of the Hejaz, Saudi Arabia’s western province. While nominally the officer in charge of the consulate’s visa section, I found that, out of some 20 Americans at the consulate, there were only three people (including myself) whom I knew for a certainty to have no ties, professional or familial, to any of the US intelligence services (chiefly, the National Security Agency (NSA) – the communications-intercepting and cipher-breaking arm of the US government – and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) – the American organization whose covert operations include spying on and overthrowing lawfully elected governments or, if need be, assassinating their leaders at the behest of US politicians).
The CIA’s Consulate General in Jeddah
Before leaving Washington, I had met with the then-US ambassador to Saudi Arabia, Walter Cutler, who spent nearly 45 minutes telling me about all the problems my predecessor had caused him in refusing visas to various applicants. An administrative official in the Near East Bureau, Ellen Goff, also mentioned that there were odd issues involving visas at Jeddah. However, the State Department Desk Officer for Saudi Arabia, in response to my query about these strange statements, said he had no idea of what they were talking about, opining only that Cutler himself was a peculiar duck.
Upon arrival in Jeddah in September 1987, I learned the truth about the situation – very quickly and very unpleasantly. I was bombarded with demands (not requests) by the American Consul General (Jay Philip Freres), the Political Officer and his successor, a Commercial Officer and the head of the Political/Economic Section, to issue visas to people who had no ties (either to Saudi Arabia or to their own country) strong enough to cause them to return to Jeddah or their homeland once they had arrived in America.
Al Qaeda 2 United States of America 0
The 9/11 ruse to corner the last remaining large volume oil fields of Iraq and Iran has destroyed the psyche of the United States of America.
The 9/11 Commission report goes to great lengths to explain that they were instructed not to place blame or fault on any of the United Stats Government agencies for 9/11. Those instructions by the Bush Administration to the 9/11 Commission is clearly an indication that the United States Government played a key role in Al Qaeda’s success on 9/11. Either by complete incompetence by the United States Government or by knowingly not stopping Al Qaeda’s plans; it is that simple.
The Christmas day Joke is just the manifestation of the complete corruption of the United States Government political system.
Don’t forget the CIA’s other pastime; poisoning the poor and minorities of America and the world:
http://www.youtube.com/results?search_query=black+ops+assassin+debriefed+1+of+12&search_type=&aq=0
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rhaJtklFhyM&feature=PlayList&p=B3C6053BE534DB86&index=0&playnext=1
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bZ-TSOpnauU&feature=PlayList&p=1B7CB5E97A7F673D&index=0&playnext=1
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This post was mentioned on Twitter by ThePublicRecord: Intelligence Failures Of The Highest Order: 9/11 And Christmas 2009 http://bit.ly/8twlNu...
CLG’s BREAKING NEWS and COMMENTARY
Last updated: 01/15/2010 19:21:44
http://www.legitgov.org/#breaking_news
Clerics in Yemen warn of jihad if US sends troops 14 Jan 2010 A group of prominent Muslim clerics warned Thursday they will call for jihad, or holy war, if the U.S. sends troops to fight al-Qaida in Yemen. The group of 15 clergymen includes the highly influential Sheik Abdul-Majid al-Zindani… who is courted by the Yemeni government for his important backing. “If any foreign country insists on aggression and the invasion of the country or interference, in a military or security way, Muslim sons are duty bound to carry out jihad and fight the aggressors,” the clerics said in a statement.
Why is the American press silent on the Israeli role in NW Flight 253?
By Patrick Martin
16 January 2010
http://www.wsws.org/articles/2010/jan2010/f253-j16.shtml
Nearly a week ago, on January 10, the Israeli newspaper Ha’aretz carried a news article by correspondent Yossi Melman pointing out the role of an Israeli security firm, International Consultants on Targeted Security (ICTS), in the failed attempt to detonate a bomb on board Northwest Airlines Flight 253.
ICTS subsidiaries I-SEC and PI are responsible for security screening of passengers at Amsterdam’s Schiphol Airport, where accused suicide bomber Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab boarded the Detroit-bound jet. The company uses screening technology to profile passengers and identify security risks, based on the experience of the Israeli intelligence services. Former El Al Airlines and Shin Bet security personnel established ICTS in 1982 to market their expertise, and many US airlines use their services or technology.
According to Ha’aretz, Abdulmutallab was screened by ICTS, but the security agents failed to identify him as a threat, despite ample evidence.
“Even if US intelligence failed and the name of the Nigerian passenger was not pinpointed as a suspect for the airline, he should have stirred the suspicion of the security officers,” the newspaper wrote. “His age, name, illogical travel route, high-priced ticket purchased at the last minute, his boarding without luggage (only a carry on) and many other signs should have been sufficient to alert the security officers and warrant further examination of the suspect. However, the security supervisor representing I-SEC and PI allowed him to get on the flight.”
While I agree with the thrust of the article there is one error that needs to be corrected. The United States had not broken “Japanese Military Codes” in 1941. What was broken was the “Purple” system which was a high level Diplomatic system. We had no direct warning but many indications that war was coming. A modern anolgy might be that if someone were able to read the State Department communications of Seceretarty Clinton it would probaly not give any of our enimies real tactical military intelligence that they could act upon.