Last month, the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU)’s National Security Project released a series of records from Navy and Army criminal investigations obtained through the Freedom of Information Act. These newly-obtained records provide snapshots to a war kept tightly under wraps, revealing not only the costs of war on Iraqi and Afghan civilians, but also the gaps in training and preparation that have placed both civilians and U.S. forces at risk.

“The most important thing about these records is that they shine a light into this war,” says Retired Army Colonel Mike Pheneger, who had served in army intelligence as Deputy Director of Intelligence for Central Command and Director of Intelligence for U.S. Special Operations Command. “I don’t know if anyone in the army has read hundreds of these investigations together before the ACLU forced the issue. By looking at these incidents writ large, there is a lot that can be learned, things that could have impacted the course of the war.”

The incidents documented range from what appear to be tragic accidents involving miscommunication at traffic checkpoints in Iraq to stunning cases of premeditated murder, where an Iraqi man, Hashim Awad, was, as alleged in the Navy records, shot without reason and his body planted at the side of the road with a shovel to frame him as an insurgent.

Informing on the Price of War

Spurred on by the military cover-ups of the Haditha massacre and the government’s restrictions on press freedoms in Iraq and Afghanistan, the ACLU filed a FOIA request in 2006 to the Department of Defense. After receiving incomplete records – mostly compensation claims filed by Iraqis – ACLU pressed the Pentagon in court to gain further information.

“The Freedom of Information Act has been an important tool in bridging the information gap that existed to allow Americans to make more informed decisions about the costs of war in Iraq and Afghanistan,” said ACLU attorney Nasrina Barghazie, one of three lawyers who handled the FOIA demand.

These newest records cover investigations by the Naval Criminal Investigative Services (NCIS), the primary law enforcement agency of the Navy and Marine Corps. They also include Army Regulation (AR) 15-6 investigations, first-level inquiries conducted by an impartial officer. Both AR 15-6 and NCIS investigations can lead to court martial or other escalated military justice procedures.

Lessons from a Politically Charged Death

Among these, numerous NCIS files regarding the death of Mohamed al-Sumaidaie, the cousin of the Iraqi Ambassador to the U.S. Samir Sumaidaie, were also released. The 21-year old was shot at close range when, as his family alleges, attempting to lead Marines to an empty, ceremonial AK-47 in his family’s home during a door-to-door weapons search in Haditha.

Following the death, Ambassador al-Sumaidaie pressed for an investigation, and in a Newsweek article last year, the deceased family said they expected “a whitewash.” These latest records show the final verdict: no criminal culpability could be established.

The testimony of one investigating Colonel speaks to the possibility that “command influence” might have resulted in at least one Marine “holding back the truth.” Conflicting testimonies leave an unclear picture as to whether Mohamed al-Sumaidaie led the Marines to the gun, as the family and one Marine allege, or instead Mohamed al-Sumaidaie appeared in the middle of the search with the AK-47 pointed threateningly, as the Marines responsible for the death claim.

While the question of intent is murky in this case, there is much to be learned from these key patterns raised in this and other records according to Pheneger. The 30-year veteran of army intelligence reviewed the thousands of pages released by the ACLU.

“This situation was a classic, clear example of many of the issues brought out by these records,” Pheneger notes. “Here, all those involved were Reservists from a unit in Ohio, there were communications problems between Iraqis and U.S. soldiers, there is the possibility soldiers were not properly trained, and it is a high-risk situation.”

Training Gaps and the Reserve and National Guard

The impact of the use of reservists has been a pressing question throughout the war. At certain moments in 2005, National Guard and Reserve forces have composed up to one-half of deployed troops. Despite protest by state governors and members of Congress citing this lack of training for Guardsmen and Reservists, the Pentagon moved contrary to expected in 2007 and removed the limits on re-deployment of Guardsmen and Reservists. At the same time, the training period for these soldiers was reduced by half, to three months, part-time.

The Marine Corp Reserve’s “Lima Company” 3rd Battalion of the 25th Marine Regiments Reserve Unit, responsible for the al-Sumaidaie search and others in 14 major Iraqi cities, had barely been taken out of reserve duty before being placed in some of the most conflicted areas of Iraq. The month prior to the al-Sumaidaie incident, one squad of the 1st Platoon had either been wounded or killed, and by the end of their tour, the Reservists returned with 59 Purple Hearts for wounded or killed personnel, 23 awarded posthumously.

A second incident in the Army “15-6″ records from March 2005 also raises this question, where members of a National Guard battalion from California were investigated for excessive force in a ground assault on an Iraqi home. The report details how one Staff Sergeant “shot an unarmed man in the back” and notes “disproportionate force” and “culpable negligence” from several of the soldiers. “The unit was already under other investigations for incidents involving torture of Iraqis using taser and stun guns.

Pheneger explains that while there are probably thousands of reservists who are doing “great jobs,” there remains a gap in training and small unit leadership. In the case of the California National Guard unit, the Army did eventually replace the army did eventually replace the battalion commander and the leaders of at least one platoon and a senior Non-Commission Officer.

Communication and the Escalation into Violence

Communication issues are also a consistent theme in these thousands of pages obtained by the ACLU.

“U.S. forces have great difficulty effectively communication with Iraqi civilians in a wide variety of contexts, whether at Traffic Control Points, in areas where local nationals are denied entry, or when making sweeps of homes looking for insurgents or weapons,” Pheneger says. “Often times, soldiers are operating with barely remembered, not well pronounced phrases in Arabic taught months back. This is a very dangerous thing.”

During the first Gulf War, the U.S. worked with hundreds of translators educated in U.S. and U.K. universities and serving in the Kuwaiti national army. In this case, the shortage and quality of translators and language training is, as Pheneger describes, at levels comparable to the war in Vietnam.

At checkpoints, these gaps turn deadly. Over 300 of the 550-plus incidents in the Army and Navy’s released records involve vehicle checkpoints and incidents where U.S. or Coalition personnel quickly moved to using deadly force, resulting in possibly elevated death tolls.

Not only are the language barriers problematic at these checkpoints, but the non-verbal procedures for flagging civilians are equally rudimentary: unamplified shouting, hand signals, warning shots. Few incidents from the 2005-2006 records show military personnel using bullhorns, spot lights, green light lasers, or other technology to ensure communication.

Stress is also extremely elevated at these areas: the troops themselves are very exposed, and the problem of “vehicle-borne improvised explosion devices” (VBIED or SVBEID), or vehicle suicide bombs, has been consistently drilled into troops mind as an ever-present threat.

Some officials, it seem, are starting to see the danger in this explosive combination of stress, miscommunication, and fear. In one Army record, a Brigade Commander notes a “contrast” between “the low percentage of SVBEID with the high percentage of [Escalation of Force] incidents that injure or kill local nationals.” He suggests re-training in the escalation tactics and in the use of deadly force.

“I hope that there records are in fact indicating that somewhere along the line, people are realizing that force self protection is one thing but you have to consider the civilian population at all times,” says Pheneger.

Pheneger and other military analysts have noted that this awareness of civilian deaths and injuries is a key in counterinsurgency – and has been lacking in early U.S. policy in Iraq.

“Counterinsurgency requires long training and different kinds of training. It is important to recognize that the civilian population is critical to success: you fail with them and you fail with your insurgency population,” he notes. “These records indicate that yes, people were in danger, but our forces should have been taking a lot more measures and worked even harder to reduce civilian deaths.”

Robert Chlala is a freelance journalist based in Los Angeles. He has worked for over 7 years in policy and communications with non-governmental organizations dealing with the Middle East, international law, immigration and other pressing issues. He can be reached at robert.chlala@gmail.com