The drama surrounding Gen. Stanley McChrystal’s departure as the head of US/NATO command presents an opportunity to take a fresh look at the United States’ counterinsurgency (COIN) strategy in Afghanistan.

After a speedy crush of Taliban proxy regime in Afghanistan in October of 2001, the United States continued with its strategy of counterterrorism to annihilate remaining Al Qaeda and Taliban, as they curled back into their caves across the Durand Line into Pakistan. Even though some covert clandestine operations were exercised to hit the leadership of Al Qaeda in Pakistan, the Pakistani government’s protest of these operations changed the face of the conflict.

Since the beginning of 2003, while George W. Bush’s administration was busying to find unfounded weapon of mass destruction in Iraq, the Taliban and Al Qaeda, with the help of Pakistani Inter-Service Intelligence (ISI), and funding from their Saudi cohorts, had regrouped to launch attacks against Afghan civilians and International coalition forces, an intense violent insurgency had been born.

“Insurgencies, like cancers, exist in thousands of forms, and there are dozens of techniques to treat them. Hundred of different populations in which they occur, and several major schools of thoughts on how best to deal with them, the idea that there is one single ‘silver bullet” panacea for insurgency is therefore an unrealistic as the idea of a universal cure for cancer,” wrote Dr. David Kilcullin an expert on guerrilla warfare.

Unrealistic. Theoretically perhaps, but in Afghanistan the cancer has been diagnosed. The Taliban, as the insurgents, are composed of almost 100 percent Pashtuns from both sides of the Durand Line, and Pashtuns are the major ethnic group that makes up more than 42 percent of Afghanistan’s demographic. In Kabul, the leader of the central government is a Pashtun from the province of Kandahar, Taliban’s de-facto capital. At the last count, the Taliban were less than 8 percent of the over all population.

In addition, there are other competing insurgent groups in the Afghan war theater. Examples include the Hezb-i Islami led by the FBI’s most wanted man Gulbuddin Hekmatyar and the notorious Haqqani network, led by Maulavi Haqqani a dear friend of ISI boss Gen. Ahmad Shuja Pasha. Thus, all these groups continue to receive unwavering and consistent support from Pakistan’s ISI.

Evidently, popular support is a common objective for all actors in an insurgency, both winning support and preventing insurgents from gaining support are crucial apparatus of any counterinsurgency. Consequently, one elements of COIN according to the U.S.’s military field manual is that: “The host nation must uphold the rule of law and provide a basic level of essential services and security for the populace.”

Gen. Stanley McChrystal, who took over the US/NATO command in May of 2009 is a savvy General and knew that COIN would not work in Afghanistan, because the leader of the central government is a very weak, and unpopular Pashtun who is unable to unite and solidify his Pashtun base, let alone for his government to provide basic services for its people.

To add salt to injury, Gen. Stanley McChrystal witnessed the Afghan presidential election not producing leadership reflective of a fair process, but instead, a stage-managed second act for Karzai and his warlords. In his speech at West Point, President Obama also acknowledged that by stating: “Afghanistan’s difficult, extended election process and evident signs of the absence of rule of law made clear the limits of the central government in Kabul.”

The absence of rule of law and Mr. Karzai’s severe unpopularity among Pashuns; in addition to his appeasement of Quetta Shura (Taliban’s leadership support base in Quetta, Pakistan) and the current debate on reconciliation with the Taliban which threatens to widen factionalism within the Afghan National Army, and trust deficit between Karzai government and the Afghan people, are major factors why the US’s COIN strategy is rendered non-linear and unpredictable. Despite the fact that the goal of COIN is to protect good guys, experts such as Dr. David Kilcullen recognized that: “Make no mistake: Counterinsurgency is war, and war is inherently violent. Killing the enemy is and will be a key of guerrilla warfare. Some insurgents at the irreconcilable extremes simply cannot be co-opted or won over; they must be hunted down killed, or captured, and this is necessarily a ruthless conduct with the utmost energy that the laws of war permit.”

Gen. David Patraeus, who has just taken over the command of US/NATO forces in Afghanistan, is very familiar with COIN as he has authored a book on the subject. He has likely recognized that the Afghan war theater has evolved. It is obvious to most analysts who understand the inner working of the Afghan government that more Hezb-i Islami members are joining Karzai’s government as Ministers and they even have infiltrated the Office of the President. Gen. Patreaus would be well advised to develop a new COIN tailored to deal with this evolved environment, in order to suppress the Taliban’s momentum and to invest as much as possible in Afghanistan’s greatest asset- its people.

Gen. David Patraeus has many resources to achieve this. He has a unanimous blessing of the U.S. lawmakers; in particular; senior ranking member Sen. Dianne Feinstein (D-California), chair of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. She has signaled that if Gen. Patreaus cannot work with Ambassadors Eikenberry and Holbrooke, that they should be replaced. This type of bipartisan support is quite unique and Gen. Patraeus should seize this opportunity to bring together a team that can generate results.

The other side of COIN is an assessment of the “host nation”. Almost nine years of Karzai rule has produced no results. Instead his failure has attributed to pushing people back to the influence of the Taliban. For America, Mr. Karzai’s perplexing behavior poses a crucial challenge that represents a critical impasse for an undeviating peaceful settlement of the conflict. Therefore, The US should be consistent in stressing the importance of continuity in the Afghan process that produces a result that is fair as perceived by the Afghan people. Nine years of non-compliance of the Karzai government should be a serious red flag. It raises a legitimate concern: “What do we do, not if, but when, Karzai doesn’t listen/cooperate?”

Surely, the U.S. has many able politicians, military leaders, and diplomats who know that the United States is a transitory custodian of Afghanistan’s future as its troops and billions of dollars of aid in Afghanistan gives the US the duty to be proactive and to ensure that its investment is not misused. If the Karzai government does not want to cooperate, then the U.S. should focus its assistance more on the Afghan people at the local level so that at least their basic needs are met. Until there is a central government that can be trusted to expend those recourses wisely, donors need to better monitor and disburse their resources where it will bring direct benefits to local population. Simply withholding U.S. aid will hurt the poor and will create impediments to its strategy. There are solutions with the political will to render the war in Afghanistan “winnable.” The United States should not just continue to flip the “COIN” in Afghanistan.

Wahid Monawar is former Chief of Staff of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Afghanistan, Governor of Afghanistan to the IAEA, and the founder of the Neo-Conservative Party of Afghanistan. He is currently an associate of Zurich Partners.